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1. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius  
 
The book that we now know in English as the Meditations of the Roman 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius was given that title by Meric Casaubon when he 
published his translation in 1634.1 Over the centuries it has been given a variety 
of titles in modern European languages, including Thoughts, Commentaries, 
Pensées, Reflexions, and Ricordi.2 None of these really captures the sense of the 
Greek title that is preserved in the manuscript tradition, Ta eis heauton, which 
might best be translated as To Himself.3 Although it is unlikely that this title was 
devised by Marcus himself,4 it is nevertheless apt and offers a way in to thinking 
about what Marcus was doing when he was writing these notes.  
	
1 See Casaubon (1634), who went on to publish an edition of the Greek text in 1643. In what 
follows I have in general relied on the text and quote from the translation in Farquharson (1944), 
occasionally modified. There is a more recent edition in Dalfen (1987) and the first volume of a 
new edition in Hadot and Luna (1998). Material in his chapter has also been incorporated, in a 
slightly different form, in Sellars (2021).  
2 For titles of translations up to 1908 see Wickham Legg (1910).  
3 The title is recorded in the editio princeps, which was based on the now lost Palatine 
manuscript (on which see Ceporina (2012) 55-56). Many have assumed that the title was taken 
over from the manuscript, although Ceporina (2012) 47 suggests that it may have been added by 
Xylander. It is literally rendered by a few translators; see e.g. Rendall (1898). When translated 
into Latin it is usually, though not universally, translated literally as ad se ipsum. It is worth 
noting that Casaubon’s full title in English was Meditations Concerning Himselfe.  
4 The title is first mentioned by Arethas of Caesarea (c. 850-935), Scholia in Lucianum 207,6-7 





With the exception of Book 1, which may have been composed separately,5 the 
Meditations presents itself as a series of occasional reflections on a wide range of 
personal and philosophical topics in no particular order and with no obvious 
structure. There is no reason to think that the text was intended as anything 
other than a series of notebook reflections on topics preoccupying the author. 
What we have, then, is a series of private notes in which Marcus is in dialogue 
with himself.6  
 
With a private text like this it can be difficult to know for sure what the author 
was trying to do. Helpfully Marcus gives us his own account of what he was 
doing.7 Some people look for retreats from the pressures of everyday life by 
withdrawing to the countryside but as a philosopher Marcus can simply retreat 
into himself (eis heauton anachôrein). He writes “Continually, therefore, grant 
yourself this retreat and repair yourself (ananeou seauton)”. This is not a 
permanent retreat but simply a brief period of rest and reflection before 
returning to the business of everyday life. What is the purpose of this retreat? It 
is to reflect on “brief and fundamental truths” (brachea kai stoicheiôdê) already 
within the mind in order to “wash away all distress” (to pasan lupên apoklusai) 
and to attain “perfect ease” (eumareia), which he identifies with “good behavior” 
	
6.81c (dated 364; see Farquharson (1944) xv) does not use the title but instead calls the work 
Precepts or Admonitions (parangelmata). In the Meditations Marcus refers to his own writings as 
hupomnematia (little notes), at 3.14.  
5 On the distinctive character of Book 1 see Rutherford (1989) 48-125, Hadot and Luna (1998), xli-
clxxxiii, Gill (2013) lxxv-lxxxiv.  
6 On the Meditations and self-dialogue see Ackeren (2011) 1: 206-287. For a wider discussion of 
the concept of self in Roman Stoicism, see Reydams-Schils (2005).  
7 See M. Ant. 4.3. All passages in the remainder of this paragraph come from here. For 
commentary see Farquharson (1944) 309-11; Gill (2013) 120-22. Brunt (1974) 3 says of this passage 




(eukosmia). He then gives us a couple of examples of what he has in mind, such 
as reminding himself that he is by nature a social animal in order to keep in 
check any anger he might feel towards people who behave poorly. He goes on to 
suggest that there are two fundamental ideas that must be kept ‘ready to hand’ 
(procheiros): 1) that mental disturbances are the product not of things but of our 
judgements (hupolêpsis), and 2) nothing is stable and everything passes, subject 
to universal flux (metabolais). He then summarizes these two principles as 
concisely as possible, presumably in order to aid memorization: ho kosmos 
alloiôsis, ho bios hupolêpsis, which we might translate expansively as “the 
cosmos is in continual change; the concerns of human life are the product of 
opinion”.8 When Marcus was writing the Meditations he was engaged in a 
practice of reminding himself of these and other central philosophical 
principles, in order (as he tells us) to overcome distress (lupê) and to cultivate a 
state of complete ease (eumareia).9  
 
In his monograph on Marcus Aurelius entitled The Inner Citadel Pierre Hadot 
characterized this sort of therapeutic self-dialogue as a spiritual exercise.10 
Hadot borrowed the phrase ‘spiritual exercise’ from Ignatius of Loyola but both 
	
8 M. Ant. 4.3.4. As an aside from our central concern here, it is worth noting that these two 
fundamental principles that Marcus thinks he ought to keep ready to hand are not ethical 
principles relating to conduct. Instead one is logical (conceived broadly), the other physical. 
Marcus is interested in logic and physics – not logical and physical theory, but rather living in 
accord with a series of logical and physical claims central to Stoicism. In 4.3 as a whole he shows 
us how reflecting on doctrines in Stoic epistemology and physics might contribute to the 
cultivation of a mind at complete ease and in good order.  
9 Distress (lupê) is one of the four principal types of emotion (pathê) the Stoics sought to avoid. 
It is, on their account, a belief (or the product of a belief) in a present evil. See e.g. Diogenes 
Laertius 7.110-11, Cicero, Tusc. 3.24-25 (SVF 3.385), 4.14 (SVF 3.393) (where it is rendered into Latin 
as aegritudo), with discussion in Sorabji (2000) 29-32.  
10 See Hadot (1992). Hadot first used the phrase ‘spiritual exercise’ in relation to Marcus Aurelius 




the phrase and the sorts of practices it refers to have ancient precedent.11 In the 
next section I shall examine the tradition of spiritual exercises in ancient 
thought before Marcus, beginning with an ancient discussion of the idea. Then 
in the section after I shall return to the Meditations and consider some of 
Marcus’s own spiritual exercises in more detail.  
 
2. Spiritual Exercises Before Marcus  
 
Marcus is explicit about his debt to his Stoic predecessor Epictetus, whose 
Discourses (recorded for us by Arrian) he tells us he read.12 Epictetus was himself 
influenced by another Stoic, Musonius Rufus, whose lectures he attended at 
Rome. Notes from those lectures were recorded by Musonius’s student Lucius 
and the notes from one of those lectures have come down to us under the title 
On Exercise (Peri askêseôs).13  
 
Musonius’s interest in exercise (askêsis) stems from his conviction that 
philosophy is not merely a theoretical discourse but, fundamentally, an activity 
aimed at transforming one’s life. The study of virtue, he suggests, ought to be 
conceived as something akin to the study of medicine or music, namely 
something we study in order to gain a practical skill.14 Like a student of medicine 
or music, “a man who wishes to become good not only must be thoroughly 
	
11 See Hadot (1977), citing Rabbow (1954), with discussion in Sellars (2009) 110-18. Note also Pavie 
(2012) 19-24.  
12 M. Ant. 1.7.  
13 The text is preserved in Stobaeus 3.29.78 (3,648-51 WH) and excerpted in Hense (1905) 22-27. 
The title may well have been added by Stobaeus. It is translated in Lutz (1947) 53-57, from which 
the translations here are taken. For discussion of this passage see Geytenbeek (1963) 40-50.  




familiar with the precepts which are conducive to virtue but must also be 
earnest and zealous in applying these principles”.15 This is where exercise comes 
in: first one studies the principles or precepts (mathêmata); then one 
undertakes a period of training or exercise (askêsis).16 Musonius goes on to claim 
that this period of exercise is more important for the student of philosophy than 
it is for the student of any other art or craft, insofar as philosophy is the most 
difficult discipline to master.17 By philosophy he means the task of becoming a 
good, virtuous person.  
 
What form should this exercise take? Musonius notes that because human 
beings are comprised of both body and soul it will be necessary to undertake 
exercises appropriate to both. It is at this point that Musonius introduces the 
idea of what he calls askêsis tês psuchês, which we might translate as ‘exercise of 
the soul’, ‘mental training’, or, indeed, ‘spiritual exercise’. We might expect this 
to be contrasted with a fairly straightforward notion of physical exercise but 
instead Musonius proposes a composite form of training: “there are two kinds of 
training, one which is appropriate for the soul alone, and the other which is 
common to both soul and body”.18 This second type of training works on both 
the body and the soul at once and includes things like avoiding physical 
pleasures, testing oneself in extremes of cold and heat, training to cope with 
	
15 Muson. 6 (Hense (1905) 23,1-3).  
16 Muson. 6 (Hense (1905) 23,14-16). On this two-stage conception of philosophical education in 
Stoicism see Sellars (2009).  
17 See Muson. 6 (Hense (1905) 23,17-24,1). He explains why this is the case: “men who enter the 
other professions have not had their souls corrupted beforehand […] but the ones who start out 
to study philosophy have been born and reared in an environment filled with corruption and 
evil, and therefore turn to virtue in such a state that they need a longer and more thorough 
training”.  




thirst and hunger, and practicing endurance in the face of suffering. These sorts 
of practices benefit the body and soul at once. But what of purely spiritual 
exercises? These work on the soul alone and, although Musonius thinks both 
types of exercise are essential for anyone who aspires to become a good human 
being, these spiritual exercises are, he suggests, fundamental to philosophy. 
Musonius gives us an extended definition of what these spiritual exercises 
involve:  
 
Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing 
that the proofs pertaining to apparent goods as not being real goods 
are always ready at hand and likewise those pertaining to apparent 
evils as not being real evils, and in learning to recognize the things 
which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish 
them from those that are not truly good. In the next place it consists 
of practice in not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil, 
and in not pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in 
shunning by every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing 
by every means those which are truly good.19  
 
The central task of spiritual exercises, then, is to keep philosophical principles 
(in this case, Stoic principles regarding what is and is not good) ‘ready to hand’ 
(procheiros).20 In so doing one will be better placed to become accustomed 
(ethizesthai) to acting in accordance with those principles. It will also involve 
	
19 Muson. 6 (Hense (1905) 25,14-26,5).  
20 The topic of keeping principles procheiros recurs throughout the works of Musonius’s pupil 
Epictetus (see e.g. the titles of Diss. 1.27 and 1.30) and is echoed in the title of Epictetus’s 




the practice (meletê) of actions that embody those principles. In short, spiritual 
exercises offer the training necessary to transform oneself according to a set of 
philosophical ideas so that one consistently lives according to those ideas.  
 
Musonius does not mention any sources for his account, although we might 
note that the distinction between mental and physical/mental exercises had 
been made well before by Diogenes of Sinope, who was eulogized at length by 
Musonius’s pupil Epictetus.21 We shall come back to this Cynic ancestry later. It 
is striking, though, that Musonius makes no mention of his near contemporary 
in Rome, Seneca, and Epictetus and Marcus make no mention of Seneca either. 
Yet Seneca also engaged in spiritual exercises and he tells us that this was a 
practice he learned from someone called Sextius:  
 
All our senses must be toughened: they have a natural endurance, 
once the mind has ceased to corrupt them; and the mind must be 
called to account every day. This was Sextius’s practice: when the 
day was spent and he had retired to his night’s rest, he asked his 
mind, ‘Which of your ills did you heal today? Which vice did you 
resist? In what aspect are you better? Your anger will cease and 
become more controllable if it knows that every day it must come 
before a judge. […] I exercise this jurisdiction daily and plead my 
case before myself. When the light has been removed and my wife 
has fallen silent, aware of this habit that’s now mine, I examine my 
	
21 See Diogenes Laertius 6.70, with Goulet-Cazé (1986) 195-222. Diogenes draws a distinction 
between mental and physical exercises but goes on to suggest, like Musonius, that physical 
exercises also benefit the soul. For Epictetus on Cynicism see Diss. 3.22, which is examined in 




entire day and go back over what I’ve done and said, hiding nothing 
from myself, passing nothing by.22  
 
This is an example of keeping one’s guiding precepts ‘ready to hand’ and it also 
prefigures the practice of self-dialogue that Marcus engaged in when writing the 
Meditations. The Sextius mentioned by Seneca is Quintus Sextius, founder of a 
philosophical school in Rome where two of Seneca’s own teachers, Fabianus 
and Sotion, had studied.23 The practice of daily self-examination that Seneca 
recounts and attributes to Sextius appears to have been Pythagorean in origin 
and it is described in the Pythagorean Golden Verses (Carmen Aureum):  
 
Do not welcome sleep upon your soft eyes  
before you have reviewed each of the day’s deeds three times:  
‘Where have I transgressed? What have I accomplished? What duty 
have I neglected?’ 
Beginning from the first one go through them in detail, and then,  
If you have brought about worthless things, reprimand yourself, but 
if you have achieved good things, be glad.24  
 
As well as recommending this practice of evening self-examination, the Golden 
Verses also describe a series of mental and physical/mental exercises of the sort 
	
22 Seneca, De Ira 3.36.1-3 (translated in Kaster and Nussbaum (2010)).  
23 On the school of Sextius see Lana (1992); on Seneca’s teachers see Sellars (2014) 99-102.  
24 Carm. Aur. 40-44 (translation from Thom (1995) 97). As Thom notes ((1995) 37), these lines are 
quoted or alluded to by a wide range of ancient philosophical authors, including Cicero (citing 





outlined by Musonius, exhorting the reader to become accustomed (ethizesthai) 
to acting in accordance with a series of moral precepts.25 
 
A number of scholars have suggested that the Golden Verses is a relatively late 
text, perhaps dating from the Imperial Period.26 However, as Johan Thom has 
pointed out, there is evidence to suggest that the text is earlier than that and 
that it was known to early Stoics such as Cleanthes and Chrysippus, both of 
whom draw on it.27 If the early Stoics did know this relatively short text then no 
doubt they would have been familiar with its recommendation of this spiritual 
exercise.  
 
As well as appealing to these Pythagorean practices, Seneca also comments with 
approval on Cynic exercises. According to Seneca, Demetrius the Cynic held 
that it was far better to have just a few philosophical doctrines (praecepta 
sapientiae) ready to use than many of no practical purpose and so, like a 
wrestler, one ought to be carefully trained (diligenter exercuit) in just a handful 
of essential skills.28 The beginning philosopher, says Demetrius, must make 
those few, essential doctrines “a part of himself, and by practicing them daily 




25 See e.g. Carm. Aur. 9, 14, 35.  
26 Thom (1995) suggests that Nauck’s proposal of the 4th century AD is the opinio communionis.  
27 See Thom (2001), elaborating on points first made in Thom (1995). For Chrysippus compare 
Aulus Gellius 7.2.12 (SVF 2.1000) with Carm. Aur. 54, and for Cleanthes compare Hymn to Zeus 
23-25 (SVF 1.537) with Carm. Aur. 55-56.  
28 See Seneca, Ben. 7.1.3-4.  




Seneca was of course by no means alone among Stoics in turning to Cynic 
predecessors for inspiration. The influence of Cynicism on the early Stoa went 
well beyond Zeno’s supposedly youthful Republic,30 and as we have already 
noted Diogenes of Sinope is reported to have drawn a distinction between 
mental and physical/mental exercises prefiguring the account in Musonius 
Rufus. Diogenes Laertius writes of Diogenes of Sinope that:  
 
He used to affirm that training was of two kinds, mental and bodily: 
the latter being that whereby, with constant exercise, perceptions 
are formed such as secure freedom of movement for virtuous deeds; 
and the one half of this training is incomplete without the other, 
good health and strength being just as much included among the 
essential things, whether for body or soul. And he would adduce 
indisputable evidence to show how easily from gymnastic training 
we arrive at virtue. For in the manual crafts and other arts it can be 
seen that the craftsmen develop extraordinary manual skill through 
practice. Again, take the case of flute-players and of athletes: what 
surpassing skill they acquire by their own incessant toil; and, if they 
had transferred their efforts to the training of the mind, how 




30 See Goulet-Cazé (2003) for discussion of Cynic themes in the early Stoa. Later Stoics, 
embarrassed by the seemingly Cynic doctrines of Zeno’s Republic, tried to present it as a work of 
Zeno’s youth, written under the influence of his teacher Crates but later disowned. But, as 
Goulet-Cazé shows, Cynic ideas permeated the early Stoa more widely than that.  





The resonances with the account of exercises in Musonius Rufus are clear. Both 
draw a distinction between mental and physical exercises, insisting that they 
are equally essential, but both also acknowledge the mental benefits that come 
with various forms of physical training.  
 
We can see connections, then, between later Roman Stoic accounts of spiritual 
exercises by Musonius and Seneca on the one hand, and earlier Pythagorean 
and Cynic traditions of mental training on the other. Although it is difficult to 
be sure, given the fragmentary nature of the evidence, the presence of both 
Pythagorean and Cynic influences on the early Stoics makes it not unreasonable 
to suppose that they too may have been concerned with spiritual exercises as an 
important part of philosophical education.32 We do know that some early Stoics 
wrote books devoted to the topic of askêsis, notably Herillus and Dionysius.33 If 
this is right, then the concern with spiritual exercises that we find in Roman 
Stoics such as Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Marcus Aurelius was not a late 
innovation but rather a theme running through Stoicism from the outset.  
 
3. Spiritual Exercises in the Meditations  
 
While we find descriptions of spiritual exercises in a number of ancient texts, 
the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius stands out as a text that is itself an extended 
spiritual exercise. What we find is Marcus engaging in the sort of self-dialogue 
proposed in the Golden Verses and taken up by Sextius and Seneca. Rather than 
	
32 See in particular the previously unpublished essay ‘Chrysippus on Practical Morality’ in Brunt 
(2013) 10-27. Brunt suggests that Chrysippus may have shared more in common with Epictetus 
than is usually supposed, and that “by systematically omitting homiletic material von Arnim 
induces a false conception of old Stoic morality” (11).  




merely mentally rehearsing the difficulties of everyday life, Marcus’s mode of 
self-dialogue involves writing his thought processes down. It may well be that 
others produced these sorts of written exercises as well, but the Meditations is 
unique as the only example of such writing to come down to us. In this sense the 
Meditations taken as a whole is an example of a series of written spiritual 
exercises.34 There are various features of the text that support this, such as the 
repetition of phrases like ‘always remember’,35 and it also helps to explain the 
lack of structure and the repetition of topics. Indeed, the repetitive character of 
the text, once judged a stylistic weakness, can now be seen as an essential 
feature of this unique work.36  
 
As well as being able to consider the Meditations as a whole as a form of spiritual 
exercise, it is also possible to pick out a number of specific exercises in the text. 
Putting aside Book 1, the Meditations opens proper with the first chapter of Book 
2, which begins: “Say to yourself in the early morning: I shall meet today 
inquisitive, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, uncharitable men”.37 This 
mental rehearsal of potentially unpleasant events to come is an example of 
praemeditatio futurorum malorum, a common theme in Hellenistic philosophy 
and discussed at length by Cicero, who reports that Chrysippus had made use of 
this technique.38 Cicero notes that Chrysippus held the view that “what is 
	
34 For further elaboration of these claims see Sellars (2012).  
35 Brunt (1974) 3 (also reprinted in Brunt (2013) 365) notes that phrases such as ‘always 
remember’ (memnêso aei) are repeated some forty times; see the Index Verborum in Schenkl 
(1913) s.v. memnêsthai, memnêso to which Brunt refers, and now Rigo (2010) 129 who lists 46 
instances s.v. mimnêskô.  
36 See further Giavatto (2012) 339-42.  
37 M. Ant. 2.1. Other examples of morning exercises are described at M. Ant. 5.1 and 10.13.  
38 For the phrase praemeditatio futurorum malorum see Cicero, Tusc. 3.29. For the mention of 




unforeseen strikes us with greater force” than what we have already rehearsed in 
our minds.39 Although, as Cicero makes plain, the technique was not original to 
the Stoics, it was an established Stoic practice long before Marcus took it up in 
the Meditations.40  
 
In Marcus’s version here, he responds to his opening rehearsal of the difficulties 
he might expect to encounter in the coming day by reminding himself of a 
number of key Stoic doctrines that ought to inform his response. He opens with 
the thought that the behavior of the unpleasant people he might encounter is 
ultimately the product of their ignorance (agnoia), and so not deliberate on 
their part. Marcus himself, however, is not ignorant of how he ought to behave 
so he has no justification to respond in kind. On the contrary, he knows that he 
and these others share the same nature and that all share in a divine nature, and 
so, no matter how they behave, he ought to treat them as kinsmen (sungenês). 
Using an analogy with parts of a single organism, Marcus suggests that to work 
against other people is to act contrary to Nature (para phusin), and he concludes 
by saying that to respond to the negative emotions of others with negative 
emotions of one’s own would also be against Nature.  
 
As we can see, Marcus is implicitly drawing on a range of Stoic ideas in a way 
that highlights the interconnectedness of the Stoic system. He appeals to i) 
central ideas in Stoic physics, to give him the resources ii) to avoid jumping to 
rash judgements that might generate negative emotions, which will in turn 
	
prehistory see Hadot (1969) 60-62, referring to Pythagorean practices described in Iamblichus 
Vit. Pyth. 196 (DK 58D6).  
39 Cicero, Tusc. 3.52 (SVF 3.417).  
40 There are a number of previous Stoic instances, such as Seneca Ep. 78.29, 91.3-4, Vit. Beat. 26.1. 




mean that he can iii) act towards those whom he meets in the ethically 
appropriate way. In particular he presupposes a number of Stoic claims: that 
only virtue is good, that emotions are the product of errors in judgement, and 
that all humans are part of a single, rational community. By pre-rehearsing 
encounters with the worst sorts of people he might meet and reminding himself 
of both the appropriate way to behave in response and the philosophical 
principles that underpin that response, Marcus is training himself not to rush 
into making negative judgements about unpleasant people that would, in turn, 
generate negative emotions, lead to inappropriate behavior, and, ultimately, 
compromise the integrity of his character and the rationality of his soul. This 
early morning reflection on the day ahead complements the evening review of 
the day described by Seneca and both offer very practical examples of 
philosophical training in action.  
 
Another specific exercise we find in the Meditations is often called ‘the view 
from above’.41 There are a number of examples throughout the text,42 of which 
here is just one representative example:  
 
Watch and see the courses of the stars as if you ran with them, and 
continually dwell in mind upon the changes of the elements into 
one another; for these imaginations wash away the foulness of life 
on the ground. Moreover, when discoursing about mankind, look 
upon earthly things below as if from some place above them – 
	
41 See e.g. Hadot (1995) 238-50, discussing Marcus Aurelius alongside a wide range of other 
thinkers, and also Rutherford (1989) 155-61, focusing on parallels with earlier ancient literature. 
For this phrase in Marcus, see M. Ant. 9.30.  




herds, armies, farms, weddings, divorces, births, deaths, noise of law 
courts, lonely places, divers foreign nations, festivals, mournings, 
market places, a mixture of everything and an order composed of 
contraries.43  
 
This passage and others like it appear to be doing a number of things at once. 
First there is a meditation on universal flux and the impermanence of all things, 
designed to offer consolation for loss of various kinds and ultimately 
consolation for death. Second there is an attempt to see Nature as a whole and 
to grasp it as a single inter-connected system. Third there is an effort to put into 
a much wider context everyday human cares and concerns in order to minimize 
their significance.44 This goes hand in hand with offering a series of 
dispassionate, physical descriptions of things that are often taken to be very 
important in everyday human life, again in order to downplay their significance. 
Thus, for example, countries, over which wars are fought, are merely lumps of 
mud around a pond.45 This single mental exercise of viewing things from above 
does, then, a number of things at once, implicitly appealing to a range of claims 
from Stoic physics along the way. The frequency with which Marcus repeats or 
alludes to this vision from above in the Meditations highlights the significance 
he attached to it. In one passage he includes it among three things that he must 
	
43 M. Ant. 7.47-48. In modern editions this passage is divided into two chapters but this dates 
back only to Gataker (1652). In the earlier edition by Casaubon (1643) they are printed as a single 
chapter, ‘7.27’. There are no chapter divisions in the Greek text printed in Xylander (1559), 
although his Latin translation is divided into unnumbered paragraphs, where he prints 7.47-49 
as a single paragraph. The earliest edition containing chapter divisions I have seen is an 
anonymous reprint of Xylander’s text and translation published in Lyon in 1626 (full details in 
Wickham Legg (1910) 35-36).  
44 In a number of passages (e.g. M. Ant. 3.10, 5.24, 6.36, 9.30, 9.32), human life is put into a wider 
temporal as well as spatial context.  




keep ‘ready to hand’ (procheiros), confirming its central place in his repertoire of 
spiritual exercises.46  
 
Marcus’s reflections on ‘the view from above’ also form an example of the way in 
which many of his spiritual exercises ultimately depend on doctrines in physics 
and, although his aim is entirely practical, it is potentially misleading to 
characterize his exercises as merely ‘practical ethics,’ if that is taken to mean the 
practical application of ethical principles. In the Meditations it is the practical 
application of epistemological and physical doctrines that recurs again and 
again.47 In one particularly striking passage Marcus reflects on the contrast 
between seeing objects from a purely physical perspective and seeing them 
overlaid with cultural significance:  
 
Surely it is an excellent plan, when you are seated before delicacies 
and choice foods, to impress upon your imagination that this is the 
dead body of a fish, that the dead body of a bird or a pig; and again, 
that the Falernian wine is grape juice and that robe of purple a 
lamb’s fleece dipped in a shell-fish’s blood […]. Surely these are 
excellent imaginations (phantasiai), going to the heart of actual 
facts (pragmata) and penetrating them so as to see the kind of 
things they really are.48  
 
	
46 See M. Ant. 12.24.  
47 See e.g. 4.3.4 and 2.1 discussed above.  




Elsewhere Marcus offers a description of this technique of describing objects 
from a physical perspective, a technique clearly aimed at undermining excessive 
attributions of value to such things:  
 
Always make a figure or outline of the imagined object as it occurs, 
in order to see distinctly what it is in its essence (kat’ ousian), 
naked, as a whole and parts; and say to yourself its individual name 
and the names of the things of which it was compounded and into 
which it will be broken up. For nothing is so able to create greatness 
of mind as the power methodically and truthfully to test each thing 
that meets one in life, and always to look upon it so as to attend at 
the same time to the use which this particular thing contributes to a 
Universe of a certain definite kind, what value it has in reference to 
the Whole, and what to man […].49  
 
This technique of physical description has the virtue not only of ensuring that 
objects are valued correctly but also of enabling one to grasp objects as they are 
in themselves, which is an important end in itself. Many of the spiritual 
exercises we find in the Meditations, including ‘the view from above’, employ 
this kind of physical perspective on the world, both for its own sake and for its 





49 M. Ant. 3.11.  
50 For further discussion of this kind of physical description see esp. Hadot (1972), but note also 




4. Concluding Remarks  
 
By way of conclusion there are two points that might be emphasized. First, for 
Marcus and the other Stoics discussed here – let alone all ancient philosophers 
– there is no suggestion that philosophy was merely a series of spiritual 
exercises. Musonius Rufus is quite explicit that this sort of mental training 
comes after the study of philosophical theories, upon which it is grounded. 
Philosophy remains an activity devoted to rational inquiry into what exists and 
what has value. Musonius’s point is that the study of, say, virtue ought to be not 
merely for the sake of being able to supply a definition of virtue but ultimately 
for the sake of becoming a virtuous person.51 In this he is at one with Socrates. 
Spiritual exercises to do not challenge or replace the sort of rational inquiry 
usually identified with philosophy, they supplement it. In the Meditations 
Marcus refers to philosophy as an art,52 to which his spiritual exercises 
contribute along the lines that Musonius suggests. First one studies 
philosophical theory and only after that does one undertake the exercises 
necessary to digest that information and so transform one’s behavior.53 As 
Marcus himself puts it, it is a task of dyeing one’s soul a new color,54 something 
that requires the repetition of key ideas, and something that Marcus himself 
does throughout his own notes to himself. This is analogous to the practical 
training that a student of an art or craft must undergo after they have studied its 
	
51 The same point is made throughout Epictetus; see e.g. Diss. 2.19, 3.21.  
52 See e.g. M. Ant. 4.2, 5.1, 6.16, 6.35, 7.68, and 11.5, with Sellars (2012) 453-54. 
53 The comparison with digestion can be found in Seneca (Ep. 2.2-4, 84.5-8) and Epictetus (Diss. 
2.9.18, 3.21.1-4, Ench. 46) and is discussed in Sellars (2009) 121-22.  




basic principles. Thus spiritual exercises are the practical training that forms 
just one part of philosophy conceived as an art of living.55  
 
As a book of such exercises, it is important also to remember that, second, 
Marcus’s Meditations is an idiosyncratic and partial book. It comprises a series 
of spiritual exercises about topics that were of particular importance to Marcus 
at the time he was writing. It does not pretend to offer a complete or 
comprehensive account of all the possible spiritual exercises a Stoic philosopher 
might deploy, much less the theoretical principles upon which those exercises 
are grounded. Insofar as these exercises are designed to put philosophy to work 
in order to overcome some of Marcus’s personal problems, it inevitably focuses 
on a range of negative issues in his own life. These ought not to be taken as a 
complete account of either Marcus’s outlook on life or his conception of 
Stoicism. Indeed, it would be a mistake for detractors or admirers to think that 
the Meditations straightforwardly presents us with Marcus’s own version of Stoic 
philosophy. The philosophical precepts, doctrines, and arguments upon which 
Marcus’s spiritual exercises depend remain on the whole unstated.56 Of course it 
is possible to try to reconstruct Marcus’s philosophical views from passing 
remarks, implicit assumptions, and the wider background of Stoic philosophy to 
which he seems clearly committed,57 but the task of the Meditations is not to 
present us with Marcus’s unique brand of Stoicism; instead it is to help the 
	
55 For an extended discussion of the (primarily Stoic) conception of philosophy as an ‘art of 
living’ see Sellars (2009).  
56 A similar view is expressed in Brunt (2013) 447.  
57 For some doubts about Marcus’s commitment to Stoicism see Rist (1982); for a rejoinder see 




author transform himself in the light of the philosophy that, in this text, goes 
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